Review of The  New  Terrorism: Myths and Reality by Rubin, Gabriel
Montclair State University
Montclair State University Digital Commons
Department of Justice Studies Faculty Scholarship
and Creative Works Department of Justice Studies
2009
Review of The "New" Terrorism: Myths and Reality
Gabriel Rubin
Montclair State University, rubing@montclair.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/justice-studies-facpubs
Part of the Criminology Commons, and the International and Area Studies Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Justice Studies at Montclair State University Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Department of Justice Studies Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works by an authorized administrator of Montclair
State University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@montclair.edu.
MSU Digital Commons Citation
Rubin, Gabriel, "Review of The "New" Terrorism: Myths and Reality" (2009). Department of Justice Studies Faculty Scholarship and
Creative Works. 32.
https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/justice-studies-facpubs/32
Published Citation
Rubin, Gabriel (2009) "Review of The "New" Terrorism: Myths and Reality," Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency
Management: Vol. 6: Iss. 1, Article 10.
Volume 6, Issue 1 2009 Article 10
Journal of Homeland Security and
Emergency Management
Review of The "New" Terrorism: Myths and
Reality
Gabriel Rubin, Montclair State University
Recommended Citation:
Rubin, Gabriel (2009) "Review of The "New" Terrorism: Myths and Reality," Journal of
Homeland Security and Emergency Management: Vol. 6: Iss. 1, Article 10.
DOI: 10.2202/1547-7355.1555
Brought to you by | Montclair State University Lib
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/11/19 6:16 PM
The “New” Terrorism: Myths and Reality by Thomas R. Mockaitis. 2008. 
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 142 pp. ISBN 978-0-8047-5970-
7; $21.95. 
Review by Gabriel Rubin, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Montclair State University 
Thomas Mockaitis’s book represents a quality summation of much of the 
recent literature on terrorism and al-Qaeda written for a lay audience.  The author 
covers definitions of terrorism, the history of terrorism, the history and 
motivations of al-Qaeda, and how to combat the present terrorist threat to the 
United States.  From the perspective of a terrorism scholar or professional, 
Mockaitis does not drill much new ground in his book, save with his surprisingly 
narrow and intriguing definition of terrorism.  This review will begin with 
Mockaitis’s interesting take on who terrorists are and then evaluate the book’s 
other conclusions. 
 As is well-known, the definition of terrorism and a terrorist group is as 
slippery as many of the terrorists themselves.  Bruce Hoffman famously wrote an 
entire chapter in the seminal Inside Terrorism, where he struggled with defining 
the term.  Hoffman concluded that terrorism is: “the deliberate creation and 
exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of 
political change” (Hoffman 2006: 40).  But Hoffman also noted that “virtually 
any especially abhorrent act of violence perceived as against society … is often 
labeled ‘terrorism’” (Hoffman 2006: 1).  Indeed, after the 2007 summer fires in 
Olympia, Greece, the Greek government considered bringing terror charges 
against arsonists (See  
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/08/27/greece.fires.ap/index.html). 
Mockaitis sees “terror” as a tool used by conventional armies, insurgents, 
criminals, and “terrorists” alike.  He thus seeks to find a “functional rather than a 
theoretical definition of the problem” (Mockaitis 2008: 3).  The definition he 
comes up with cuts out of the equation most groups the United States calls 
“terrorist.”  He writes that terrorist groups have Utopian goals that are not up for 
negotiation, have a transnational or international focus, and employ 
“indiscriminate violence for its own sake with no larger political or other 
purpose” (Mockaitis 2008: 7-8, 13). 
If terrorists are purposeless killers with Utopian goals that are unwilling to 
negotiate, then who belongs in the category “terrorist”?  Aum Shinrikyo, or 
Supreme Truth, the Japanese millenarian cult, certainly fits this definition.  So 
does Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda in Iraq.  Neither AQI nor Al-Qaeda Central seems 
to be willing to negotiate, and both have committed heinous acts of brazen terror, 
such as the November 2005 bombing of a wedding in Amman, Jordan.  Perhaps 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Popular Front for the Liberation 
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of Palestine (PFLP) of the 1970s, when the groups were famous for hijacking 
airplanes, could be deemed terrorists.  Then again, these groups clearly had 
ethnonationalist goals in mind. 
Most of the organizations Americans know as terror groups are defined by 
Mockaitis as insurgent groups.  Militant organizations that fit this bill are the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Irish 
Republican Army.  All of these groups have nationalist aspirations, have largely 
targeted the state power they wish to upend, and have arguably used terror 
“selectively.”  Mockaitis states that insurgency is “an organized movement to take 
over a state from within through a combination of propaganda, guerilla warfare, 
and terrorism” (Mockaitis 2008: 5).  I have heard of Hezbollah and Hamas being 
called resistance groups, terrorist groups, or even political parties, but never 
insurgent groups.  The LTTE, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), and the IRA may fit 
more neatly into this definition since they have engaged in more traditional civil 
wars—albeit while relying heavily on terrorist tactics. 
In employing a decidedly narrow definition of terrorism, Mockaitis 
reopens the thorny subject of how we define the term at all.  Is it true that 
countries simply label their modern enemies terrorists?  The epithets volleyed 
between Israelis and Palestinians, the former calling the latter “terrorists” and the 
latter accusing the former of “state terror,” are a case in point.  Mockaitis is right 
that terror is a tactic that is meant to conjure an emotion.  But it is also more than 
that.  Most definitions of terror include wording to the effect that terrorists 
purposely attack non-combatants and that they do so for political purposes.  
Further, terror groups are always non-state or quasi-state actors.  
Deciphering between terrorists and insurgents may be a harder task than 
the counterterrorist community cares to admit.  Though the difference in terms 
may sometimes be moot for combating the groups, the label “terrorist” carries 
with it a message of strong condemnation that should not be taken lightly.  Much 
was made of the U.S.’s labeling of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard as a terror group 
for its activities in Iraq.  Hamas has rigorously sought international acceptance, 
but its placement on terror lists the world over has proven a major hindrance.  
Counter these examples with those of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan or the 
Badr Brigade of Iraq, groups that are seen to be insurgents not terrorists and thus 
have not been subjected to the revulsion reserved for terrorists. 
Mockaitis is right to reopen the definitional debate in the field of terrorism 
studies.  Hoffman’s definition, encompassing any organization that purposefully 
employs fear for political purposes, may be too broad.  I would like to see a 
definition that falls between Hoffman’s and Mockaitis’s.  Perhaps terrorists can be 
defined as non-state actors that purposely commit violence against non-
combatants for political purposes.  The definition of “non-combatant” would then 
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have to be wrangled over.  (For example, are Israeli civilians who served in the 
IDF non-combatants?) 
The rest of Mockaitis’s book provides a strong summation of the recent 
literature on terrorism.  He proposes that resources be used more efficiently in the 
fight against terror.  He believes that counterinsurgency (COIN) techniques 
should be employed to fight al-Qaeda and that the Global War on Terror has 
ceased to serve its purpose.  The author writes that, “COIN requires a 
comprehensive strategy to address the economic, social and political causes of 
terrorist violence.  In this strategy winning the hearts and minds of disaffected 
people improves intelligence gathering, which in turn leads to the more focused 
use of police and military force against terrorist organizations and networks” 
(Mockaitis 2008: 125). 
Mockaitis further believes that, despite al-Qaeda’s success in the late 
1990s and early 2000s in its fight against America, there must be, in the words of 
Ian Lustick, an “attempt at triage in the face of too many possible threats” 
(Lustick 2006: 96).  America is too large a country with too many “soft targets” to 
protect itself completely.  Mockaitis suggests a tripartite approach, consisting of 
antiterrorism (hardening American vulnerabilities), counterterrorism (conducting 
offensive operations against terrorists), and consequence management (planning 
for the aftermath of terror attacks so as to mitigate the consequent damage) to 
battle the terrorist threat.  He ends his book by emphasizing that, “[r]isk and 
vulnerability are the price of living in a free society” (Mockaitis 2008: 129), a 
note hit by both Ian Lustick (2006) and John Mueller (2006) in their critiques of 
the war on terror and the Department of Homeland Security. 
Mockaitis’s book presents a strong primer to the study of terrorism, 
particularly for a lay audience.  At 142 pages (with notes) it is a quick read full of 
interesting tidbits on al-Qaeda and combating the terror threat.  For scholars of 
terrorism, such as myself, I suggest reading his first chapter on definitions of 
terrorism in which Mockaitis brings a welcome new perspective to the debate on 
how terrorism should be defined. 
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